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On 12 July 1942, the Canadian Army authorized the movement of nearly seven 
hundred officers and men to the United States 
for training as part of the First Special Service 
Force (FSSF), a highly-specialized commando 
unit that was being organized for the purpose of 
conducting raids in the alpine regions of occupied 
Europe.1  From the summer of 1942 until 
disbandment in December 1944, this combined 
“North American” force consisted of soldiers 
drawn from the armies of both Canada and the 
United States. From the Aleutian Islands, to 
Monte la Difensa, Rome, and ending in Southern 
France, this élite US-Canadian infantry brigade 
established a remarkable combat record and 
became a symbol of the lasting partnership 
between our two countries. Today, the First 
Special Service Force is remembered both in 
Canada and the United States for its outstanding 
achievements in combat as well as its unique, 
bi-national composition. 
 Prior to 1942, Canadian soldiers had never 
served in such close association with the US 
Army, and even the post-war era has seen 
no similar examples of such near-complete 
integration. Within the Force, Canadian and 
American soldiers wore the same uniforms, 
carried the same weapons, and answered to 
the same superiors regardless of nationality – 
an American private could take orders from a 
Canadian sergeant, who in turn answered to an 
American or Canadian lieutenant. At the top of 
this bi-national chain of command stood Robert 
T. Frederick, US Army, the man who organized 
and led the First Special Service Force from its 
activation on 2 July 1942 until his departure 
on 23 June 1944, shortly after Rome fell to the 
Allies. 
Robert T. Frederick
ACoast Artillery officer by training, Frederick’s appointment to command the First Special 
Service Force came about largely by default. 
In the spring of 1942, while working as a staff 
officer in the Operations Division of the US 
War Department, Lieutenant-Colonel Frederick 
was assigned the task of completing a detailed 
assessment of Operation PLOUGH by Major-
General Dwight D. Eisenhower. Operation 
PLOUGH was a British scheme that called for the 
creation of specialized commando detachments, 
trained in winter warfare and equipped with 
armoured snow vehicles. The “PLOUGH Force,” 
as it was called, would be capable of conducting 
parachute or glider landings in occupied Norway, 
where the mobility provided by the proposed 
snow vehicle would allow the raiders to sabotage 
German-controlled hydroelectric dams and 
power plants throughout the country. Although 
Frederick’s report harshly criticized Operation 
PLOUGH, noting especially that the plan made 
no adequate provision for evacuating the raiding 
force upon completion of its mission, his lack 
of enthusiasm failed to dissuade his superiors 
from the project. Instead, Eisenhower appointed 
Frederick to take command of the PLOUGH Force 
itself. On 9 June 1942, Ike called the young staff 
officer into his office and told him: “Frederick, 
take this plough project. You’ve been over the 
whole thing. You’re in charge now. Let me know 
what you need.”2 
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Modest and unassuming, Frederick always 
insisted that his selection to command the FSSF 
came as a result of other, more qualified officers 
turning down the job.3  Indeed, Frederick’s 
initial reaction to Eisenhower’s offer was to 
protest that he was completely unqualified for 
the position, noting in particular his complete 
lack of infantry training and his unfamiliarity 
with parachuting, mountain operations, and 
winter warfare.4 These objections were duly 
noted and ignored, perhaps due to the fact that 
Eisenhower was leaving for the UK in a few days 
to take command of the US European Theater of 
Operations and did not want to leave behind any 
loose-ends in Washington. Another possibility is 
that Lord Louis Mountbatten, the British Chief 
of Combined Operations and a key proponent of 
Operation PLOUGH, had some influence in the 
decision and viewed Frederick’s appointment to 
command the Force as an ideal means of silencing 
his criticism of the project.5  Regardless of the 
reasons, on 2 July 1942, the First Special Service 
Force was activated by an order of the US War 
Department, with the newly-promoted Colonel 
Robert T. Frederick as the officer commanding. 
In hindsight, Eisenhower would have been hard-
pressed to select a more suitable candidate to 
command the First Special Service Force. From 
the unit’s baptism of fire atop Monte la Difensa 
to its mad-dash to the Tiber bridges during the 
liberation of Rome, this former War Department 
staff officer earned the respect and trust of his 
men by his near-constant presence on the front 
lines. During the most critical stages of any given 
battle, the best place to look for Frederick was 
said to be “up forward somewhere with the men 
who did the fighting.”6  Leading from the front, 
even after his promotion to brigadier-general in 
January 1944, Frederick became the recipient 
of no less than eight Purple Hearts for wounds 
sustained in combat, earning him the dubious 
distinction of being the most shot-at-and-hit 
general officer of the Second World War. His 
wounds were a testament to his bravery and, to 
a lesser extent, his proclivity to leave the day-
to-day operation of Force Headquarters to his 
subordinates. 
Time away from headquarters is likely to have 
provided Frederick with some respite from the 
daily complexities of administering the First 
Special Service Force, burdened as it was not 
only by the existence of a sizable foreign element 
in its ranks, but also having to contend with 
the designation of being “special”. The Second 
World War generated a remarkable number of 
highly-specialized military formations – from 
parachute infantry and glider troops to Royal 
Marine Commandos and Ranger Battalions. 
As with many of these special units, higher 
commanders did not always make allowances 
for the unique strengths and weaknesses of 
the First Special Service Force. For example, 
although the brigade-sized FSSF was equipped 
with more light machine guns and light mortars 
than a standard US infantry division,7  overall, the 
unit traded firepower for mobility by carrying no 
heavy machine guns and no mortars larger than 
a 60mm. The Force was not originally intended 
Forcemen pick their way down a ravine during a September 1942 route march near Helena, Montana. The
walking sticks are being used as substitute ski-poles in preparation for ski training during the winter months.
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for frontal attacks against conventionally-armed 
opponents, the breakout from Anzio and the 
battle of Artena notwithstanding. 
As an added complication, although Canadian 
officers and men were evenly distributed among 
the three battalion-sized “Regiments” of the 
Force, on paper, they remained grouped within 
the 1st Canadian Special Service Battalion. This 
Canadian element of the Force received its pay 
and reinforcements from within the Canadian 
system and its officers and men remained subject 
to the King’s Orders and Regulations.8  As a result 
of this arrangement, the First Special Service 
Force operated within two military systems and 
answered to two very separate chains of authority. 
While the difficulties resulting from “matters 
Canadian” and the special status of the Force 
were by no means so severe as to merit Frederick 
getting shot eight times in order to avoid 
spending time at headquarters, one should not 
underestimate the frustration of a commanding 
officer who was forced to deal with not one, but 
two military bureaucracies. 
One Force, Two Official Histories
In the 1950s and 60s, official historians in both Canada and the United States devoted 
considerable attention to the First Special Service 
Force. In the United States, Stanley W. Dziuban’s 
Military Relations Between the United States 
and Canada viewed the FSSF to be a model of 
cooperation between the Allied armies, though 
he did offer the following conclusion to his 
assessment of the Force: 
 Throughout its combat history, the First 
Special Service Force engaged but little in 
the highly specialized types of operations for 
which it had been trained…. Furthermore, the 
very nature and status of the force required 
frequent attention of the Combined Chiefs of 
Staff to proposals for employment of this group 
of less than 2,000 men, as well as diplomatic 
exchanges to obtain Canadian acceptance of 
proposals – all in all an inordinate amount 
of high-level consideration in relation to the 
size of the force. But from the point of view of 
Canadian-US relations, the unique experiment 
was a remarkable success.9 
 In Canada, official historian C.P. Stacey was 
even less enthusiastic. Surveying the difficulties 
involved in organizing the 1st Canadian Special 
Service Battalion and maintaining it in the theatre 
of war, an effort that required the repeated 
attention of Canadian authorities in Ottawa, 
Washington, and London, Stacey offered the 
following advice to his Canadian readers: 
 The First Special Service Force was a fine 
fighting unit, and the relations of Canadians and 
Americans within it seem to have left very little 
to be desired. Nevertheless, the administrative 
Force training emphasized physical and mental endurance. The soldiers seen here are
on a particularly grueling route march that covered a remarkable 47.6 miles in one day.
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and other difficulties that were encountered in 
connection with it – in matters of pay, decorations, 
and the tendency of the United States to regard 
Canadian members of this international unit as 
Canadians serving in the U.S. Army – suggest that 
any such enterprise should not be undertaken on 
another occasion without careful thought.10  
 Stacey and Dziuban indicate that the First 
Special Service Force was an administrative 
handful for the Canadians and a political football 
for the United States. Both historians recognize 
that these difficulties posed no insurmountable 
obstacles within the Force itself, where relations 
between Canadian and American soldiers were, 
on the whole, excellent. Nevertheless, the US 
official historian points to the disproportionate 
amount of high-level consideration of the 
Force and the failure to make full use of the 
unit’s special training as causes for concern. 
Further, while Dziuban dismisses Canadian 
“administrative complications” by stating 
that these “were in the over-all so small and 
were handled so competently by the Canadian 
administrative personnel that they were hardly 
apparent to U.S. members of the force staff,”11  
the Canadian official historian quite obviously 
disagrees.
 What did Frederick think of all this? Did 
the special capabilities of the FSSF merit the 
high-level consideration it received? Did the 
Force Commander consider the presence of a 
Canadian element within the unit to be a help 
or a hindrance? After the war, Frederick tended 
to provide only a tactfully-vague response to any 
question regarding the use and misuse of the 
Force or the relative merits of the unit’s bi-national 
composition.12  On at least three occasions during 
his tenure as Force Commander, however, 
Frederick provided his superiors with detailed 
reports on the unique difficulties encountered 
by his command. His letters, now held by the 
US National Archives in College Park, Maryland, 
and the Hoover Institution Archives at Stanford 
University, provide direct answers to difficult 
questions, particularly in regards to the challenge 
of finding a mission suited to the special training 
and capabilities of the Force and the international 
complications that dogged the unit at every stage 
of its existence. Taken together, these letters 
indicate that these problems were never fully 
solved to the Force Commander’s satisfaction, 
thereby offering some of the best insight available 
into the final decision, in December 1944, to 
disband the First Special Service Force, return 
the Canadians to their own army, and reorganize 
the American element along the lines of a 
conventional US Army infantry regiment. 
“Use It or Lose It”: Finding a 
Mission, February 1943
In late September 1942, Frederick travelled to the United Kingdom in order to discuss the 
development of Operation PLOUGH. It was 
during this visit that the Force Commander 
learned of a potentially-disastrous lapse of 
communication between the British authorities 
and the PLOUGH planning headquarters in 
Washington. For starters, Frederick learned 
that the British Chief of Air Staff had expressed 
serious reservations about the project, as he was 
reluctant to divert bombers from their assigned 
missions over Germany in order to parachute the 
Force and its vehicles into Norway. Before doing 
The rugged terrain of the Montana hills provided 
ideal training conditions as the Force prepared for a 
parachute descent into occupied Europe for the purpose 
of destroying German-held hydroelectric dams and 
other targets. Unfortunately, Operation PLOUGH was 
cancelled before the Force had a chance to put many of 
its unique capabilities to use.
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so, the Air Chief would have to be convinced 
that Operation PLOUGH could result in greater 
damage to the enemy than bombing Germany 
directly.13  Further, in London, a representative of 
the Special Operations Executive (SOE) informed 
Frederick that his organization already had a 
plan for destroying Norwegian hydroelectric 
stations using Norwegian saboteurs. Finally, 
the Norwegian government-in-exile was voicing 
strong opposition to the PLOUGH project as 
they expected the destruction of Norway’s 
infrastructure to cause greater hardship for the 
Norwegian people than it would for the German 
occupiers. In short, Operation PLOUGH was 
about to be permanently sidelined, and on 
26 September, Frederick cabled the following 
message to Washington:
 Suspend effort on present line…. New plan 
may be radically different and not concerned with 
hydroelectric or other industrial installations….
Cease training on hydroelectric installations 
and…stress general tactical training, to include 
attack of fortifications, pill boxes, barracks and 
troop concentrations. Change in weapons may 
be necessary to provide greater firepower, so 
suspend further small arms training pending a 
decision.14 
  Returning to the United States in October, 
Frederick reported the results of his visit to 
Lieutenant-General McNarney, the US Army’s 
Deputy Chief of Staff, who ordered all planning 
stopped pending a decision by the Chief of Staff, 
General George C. Marshall. Given that the 
United States had originally adopted PLOUGH 
at the suggestion of the British, and since that 
time had devoted considerable resources to 
its development, Marshall and McNarney were 
quite understandably exasperated by this turn 
of events. However, in light of the investment 
already made in training and equipping the Force, 
not to mention development of the snow vehicle, 
Marshall decided to retain the FSSF for possible 
employment in other theatres. All that remained 
was to approach the Canadian authorities to 
request their continued involvement in the Force. 
 One condition of Canadian participation in 
the FSSF had been that any overseas deployment 
of Canadian soldiers required the approval of 
the Canadian Government. With the cancellation 
of Operation PLOUGH, however, Frederick now 
considered the Canadian’s right of refusal to 
be a brake on the usefulness of the Force as a 
whole. In the autumn of 1942, nearly half of the 
combat echelon of the Force was composed of 
Canadian officers and enlisted men. In the event 
of these Canadians not being permitted to take 
part in an operation, Frederick reasoned that 
their withdrawal would require an extensive 
and time-consuming reorganization of the Force 
as a whole. “It is believed that in fairness to the 
United States,” he wrote, on 16 October 1942, 
“the Canadian Government should at this time 
specifically state any limitations upon the combat 
employment of the Canadian personnel of the 
Force.”15 
 Stating specific limitations in advance, 
however, was something that the Canadians 
simply were not prepared to do, as this would 
allow the United States to send the Force, 
Above right: Parachute training in the Helena Valley, 
summer 1942. Parachute qualification was one of the 
first orders of business for volunteers arriving at Fort 
William Henry Harrison, a process Colonel Frederick 
hoped might help “separate the sheep from the goats.”
Below right: A soldier struggles with his deployed 
parachute in a stiff breeze during parachute training at 
Helena. While Canadian soldiers were officially grouped 
within the 2nd Canadian Parachute Battalion for 
administrative purposes, in practice, they were integral 
to the Force and did not form a separate contingent of 
their own
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without notification, to any theatre that was not 
specifically ruled out. Instead, the acting Chief 
of General Staff (CGS) in Ottawa, Major-General 
J.C. Murchie, suggested that Canada retain its 
right of approval prior to any deployment, but 
conceded that once this approval had been given, 
“the Canadian Government should not further 
reserve the right to withdraw the Canadian 
element from participation.”16  
 Comparing the FSSF to other examples 
of Canadians serving alongside Allied forces, 
Murchie agreed with Frederick that the 
circumstances of the Force were entirely different 
from those affecting other commands: 
In the event that a Canadian force, acting in 
combination with the forces of our allies, did 
not propose to proceed with a given operation, 
this would not affect the independent action of 
the forces of the other allies involved….Should, 
however, the Canadian element of the First 
Special Service Force be similarly withdrawn, it 
would mean, in effect, the disappearance of the 
Force as such, and the cancellation of the project 
to which it had been assigned.17 
This essential difference between the First 
Special Service Force and other Canadian 
forces acting in combination with Allied troops 
seemed to be of sufficient importance that the 
Canadian Government should relinquish the 
right to withdraw the Canadians of the FSSF 
once approval for the general project had been 
given. In a letter to the Canadian Minister of 
National Defence, Murchie stated his opinion that 
once Canadian approval had been given…“we 
can safely leave the operational planning to the 
United States authorities. They are not given to 
rash military undertakings.”18
 On 30 October, the US War Department 
accepted Murchie’s recommendations as the 
basis of continued Canadian participation in 
the Force. In Washington, Frederick’s staff began 
to consider alternate missions for the FSSF, 
including operations in the Mediterranean or the 
Soviet Caucasus.19  At the Force training grounds 
in Helena, Montana, the intensive program of 
physical conditioning, tactical problems, and 
battle drill continued, alongside a rigorous 
program of instruction in skiing, mountain 
climbing, and winter warfare.20
 By February 1943, however, the unit was still 
in training and no new mission had materialized. 
Soon it would be spring and, with the snow 
already disappearing in Europe, the Force would 
be stuck in training for another year. Seeing no 
possible use for the FSSF in the winter of 1943, 
on 3 February, Frederick wrote the following to 
Lieutenant-General McNarney:21
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF: 
Subject: First Special Service Force
The time has been reached when it is necessary to decide 
the future of the First Special Service Force. The First Special 
Service Force was created specifically for the accomplishment 
of the Plough Project at the request of British authorities, 
but in October, 1942, the Project was dropped due to the 
impracticability of executing it during the winter of 1942-
1943. Reasons for abandoning the project were that planning 
information furnished by the British mission assigned to the 
project was faulty and erroneous, airplanes to drop the Force 
into the combat area are not available, and the Norwegian 
Government did not favour the project or its objective.
At the time that the Plough Project was dropped, a new 
mission for the First Special Service Force was sought. After 
consideration of several possible missions, it was directed 
that the Force complete its winter training with a view to 
its employment in Sicily, Sardinia or Italy early in 1943. In 
accordance with the last directive, the Force has continued 
its winter training and an attempt has been made to prepare 
the Force for any operation in which it may be employed. 
Private John Johnston of Montreal, Quebec, is seen 
here in the Radicosa area during the Winter Line 
campaign of January, 1944. He is carrying a Johnson 
automatic rifle – one of the special weapons carried 
by the Force and an unusual sight in the European 
Theatre. 
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At the present time, there appears to be no possible 
employment for the Force in a winter operation during this 
winter. To hold the Force in training without its engaging 
in combat before the winter of 1943-44 would bring about 
difficult problems. 
The personnel of this Force, both United States and 
Canadian, volunteered for hazardous duty and have subjected 
themselves to a course of training more demanding and 
rigorous than has ever been attempted elsewhere, in order 
that they might be in top condition for combat… Both officers 
and men are beginning to get restless and have frequently 
stated that they volunteered for this Force in order to get into 
combat early. The problems of morale and discipline that might 
arise if the Force is continued in training for a prolonged period 
might become serious…
The expense incident to maintaining this Force is great and is 
not justified unless employment of the Force in an operation 
utilizing its special equipment and training is definitely 
foreseen. The United States is providing highly specialized and 
valuable training not only for United States Army personnel, 
but also for about seven hundred Canadian officers and 
enlisted men…
The combat personnel of the Force are now in excellent 
physical condition, and as a result of the training are able to 
withstand severe and difficult conditions. While a prolonged 
period of training would bring about greater proficiency in 
tactics, use of weapons and the performance of specialists, 
the detrimental effect on physical condition and spirit of the 
personnel would offset the gain.
The employment of the Force is limited by the necessity of 
securing from the Canadian authorities an agreement for the 
participation of Canadian personnel in the Force. More than a 
third of the officers and enlisted men of the Combat Echelon 
are Canadians, and to employ the Force without the Canadian 
personnel would seriously reduce the combat strength. 
The commitment of the War Department to British authorities 
for the continuation and training of this force are understood, 
but it is believed that unless definite employment…in the near 
future is foreseen, the unit should be discontinued and the 
personnel reassigned…
Considering the capabilities of this Force and the limitations 
upon its use, one of the following missions offers the most 
profitable use and should be decided upon at this time: 
a. Participation in an operation in the Aleutian Islands, 
if one is to be undertaken during the spring of 1943. The 
Force could participate in a strong attack to drive the enemy 
from Kiska or could be used independently in an operation 
against the enemy on Attu. In view of the interest the Canadian 
Government must feel in the Aleutian Islands, it is believed 
that agreement to the employment of Canadian personnel in 
this area would be readily obtained…
b. Transfer of the Force to the United Kingdom for 
employment on the Continent of Europe as a raiding force. 
Canadian authorities should not object to participation of the 
Canadian personnel. This employment offers little or no use 
for the special snow vehicles and would not require the winter 
training troops have received…
c. Assignment of the Force to North Africa and 
employment as a raiding force either in Africa or in the 
Mediterranean area. The Canadian Government should not 
object to this employment of Canadian personnel… The 
specialized training, other than winter training, received by 
personnel of the Force should particularly fit them for this type 
of operation. The presence of the Force in this area would 
ensure its being available where its employment is most likely. 
(signed) Robert T. Frederick,
Colonel, First Special Service Force,
Commanding.
 Frederick’s report of February 1943 highlights 
the difficulty involved in finding a mission suited 
to the highly specialized training and capabilities 
of the First Special Service Force. Having ruled 
out the possibility of a winter operation in 1942-
43, his letter to the Deputy Chief of Staff listed 
four possible alternatives for the First Special 
Service Force in the coming year: the Aleutian 
Islands, the European Theatre, North Africa, or 
the Mediterranean. Over the next four months, 
both the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the US War 
Department gave serious consideration to these 
and several other deployments. By Frederick’s 
Private Leonard adjusts medic Private Wilson’s first aid 
packboard of blankets and plasma at the First Regiment 
Aid Station. During the assault on Monte la Difensa, 
FSSF positions at the summit were kept supplied by 
means of a narrow footpath and packboards such as the 
one seen here. 
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account, one particularly busy day in Washington 
had seen the Force assigned and reassigned to six 
different missions in a period of fourteen hours.22  
While Frederick was primarily concerned with 
finding a mission, his letter also gives some 
indication of the international complications 
encountered by his command, most notably the 
requirement of securing Canadian approval for 
any proposed deployment. Prior to departing for 
overseas, Frederick quite obviously considered 
that Canadian involvement at the planning level 
limited the unit’s usefulness to the US Army. 
It remained to be seen whether the FSSF’s 
performance in combat would justify the effort 
devoted to organizing and training the unit. 
A “Special” Reinforcements Crisis, 
December 1943 – February 1944
Between February and August 1943, Allied planners considered sending the Force to 
theatres ranging from the British Isles to Burma 
before finally committing the unit to the Aleutians 
Campaign. Here, in August 1943, the First 
Special Service Force acted as the spearhead of a 
US-Canadian landing on the island of Kiska, but 
when the Japanese garrison was found to have 
secretly withdrawn and the island left abandoned, 
the Force was quickly returned to the United 
States for reassignment to the Mediterranean. 
The FSSF arrived in Italy on 17 November 1943, 
during a stalemate in the US Fifth Army’s drive 
towards Rome. For nearly a month, the Allied 
advance had been stalled before a belt of German 
fortifications known as the Winter Line. On 24 
November, the Force received orders to capture 
the summit of Monte la Difensa, a mountain 
stronghold that had been frustrating the Allied 
advance since the first week of November. On 
the night of 2-3 December, the FSSF’s Second 
Regiment conducted a daring assault up the cliffs 
on the north face of the mountain, which the 
enemy had left unguarded as they were believed 
to be impassable. After a violent firefight to secure 
the summit, the Force held its ground against 
repeated German counterattacks and artillery 
bombardments – a six-day effort that cost the 
Force some 511 casualties, or roughly a quarter 
of the its total combat strength.23  The capture 
of Monte la Difensa, however, destroyed a key 
anchor of the Winter Line and earned high praise 
for the FSSF from Lieutenant-General Mark W. 
Clark, the Commanding General of Fifth Army: 
 The Special Service Force was given the 
task of capturing la Difensa…the possession of 
First Special Service Force pack mules ascend a hillside in the rocky Italian countryside. During the mountain
fighting of January 1944, mules provided one of the best means of moving food and ammunition to the front.  
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which was vital to our further advance in that 
sector. The mission was carried out at night in 
spite of adverse weather conditions and heavy 
enemy rifle, machine-gun, mortar, and artillery 
fire on the precipitous slopes over which it was 
necessary to attack. Furthermore, the position 
was maintained despite counterattacks and 
difficulties of communication and supply. The 
fact that you have acquitted yourself well in your 
first action under enemy fire is a tribute to fine 
leadership and a splendid reward for time spent 
in arduous training.24 
 Following its success at Monte la Difensa, 
the FSSF was assigned the right flank of the 
US II Corps advance as it rolled up the German 
defences in the mountains north of the Mignano 
Gap, which guarded the entrance to the Liri Valley 
and the Highway 6 to Rome. On Christmas Day, 
First Regiment conducted a downhill frontal 
assault against prepared German defences on 
the western spur of Monte Sammucro. Though 
the attack was successful, subsequent shelling 
and losses to trench foot and exposure reduced 
several companies in First Regiment to between 
20 and 30 percent strength.25
 From New Year’s Day until 17 January, Third 
Regiment entered the fray and fought a bitter 
campaign to overcome the German defences on 
Monte Majo. Here again, the bitter cold, difficult 
terrain, and determined German resistance 
exacted a heavy toll. Extracts from the War Diary 
of the 1st Canadian Special Service Battalion 
provide some insight into the nature of Force 
operations during this period:
January 8: Today’s casualty return…lists 100 
names, half of them frostbite and exposure, the 
rest battle casualties. The weather in the hills 
is very cold, with high wind and snow. German 
resistance is quite severe, artillery and mortar 
fire is taking its toll. 
January 9: Today’s Force casualty return has 
122 names, again nearly half are frostbite and 
exposure. There soon won’t be much left of the 
Force if casualties keep up at this rate. 
January 10: News from the front is bad… The 
Force is being thrown into one action after 
another with only a handful of able-bodied men 
left and no sign of their being relieved. Seventy-
three names on today’s casualty report, 40 
frostbitten feet. Those returning to camp on light 
duty say it is really rugged and they are all played 
out. Three weeks tomorrow since they left here.26
 By the time the Force was withdrawn 
from the front on 17 January for rest and 
reorganization, the casualties suffered to date 
had reduced all three Regiments of the Force to 
approximately 50% strength. These losses were 
particularly devastating to the Canadian element, 
as it had been decided in April 1943 that the 
A communications muleskinner points to Monte Cassino, where the Force was initially slated to take part in the assault 
on a German-held monastery. Instead, the unit was sent to Anzio at the beginning of February.
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1st Canadian Special Service Battalion would 
receive no reinforcements upon departure for 
overseas. In light of this, and the fact that the 
highly-specialized Force was “acting in a straight 
infantry role as shock troops for the Fifth Army,”27  
the acting senior Canadian officer of the Force, 
Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas P. Gilday, made a 
startling recommendation to his superiors: 
We have acquitted ourselves well in battle. There 
is good feeling and many strong friendships 
between the Canadians and Americans of the 
Force. As new American reinforcements come 
in and Canadians become fewer in number, it 
will be increasingly difficult to keep the friendly 
spirit and good relations that now exist. The 
Canadian element is liable to become a source 
of embarrassment to the Americans. It will also 
become increasingly difficult to keep the existing 
high morale when it becomes known that the 
Canadians are going to be allowed to slowly 
waste away.
I strongly recommend that the Canadian 
element be withdrawn from the First Special 
Service Force while there is enough of it left to 
be of assistance to the Canadian Army. This 
withdrawal should take place immediately before 
the force is committed again in another phase 
of operations and while the force is undergoing 
re-organization.28  
 Gilday’s recommendation was subsequently 
taken up by Lieutenant-General Kenneth Stuart, 
the newly-appointed Chief of Staff at Canadian 
Military Headquarters (CMHQ) in London, who 
agreed that withdrawal of the 1st Canadian 
Special Service Battalion should take place before 
the Force returned to the front.29  In Stuart’s 
opinion, pulling the Canadians out of the FSSF 
would be difficult under any circumstances, but 
doing so while the unit was actively engaged 
was impossible as it would contradict earlier 
agreements with the United States. In Ottawa, 
however, National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) 
took an even less favourable view, refusing to act 
on Stuart and Gilday’s recommendation, citing 
the following warning from the Canadian Army 
Staff in Washington: “Any proposal to break up 
this combined unit, which is not only in a theatre 
of operations but is actually engaged against the 
enemy, would prove embarrassing to a degree and 
might be construed as hardly playing the game. 
It would certainly be difficult to put across and 
certainly would not enhance US regard for us.”30
 The result of this disagreement between 
Canadian officials in London and Ottawa was 
a two-week exchange of telegrams across the 
Atlantic, with CMHQ pressing for immediate 
withdrawal of Canadians from the FSSF while 
NDHQ in Ottawa considered other options. It was 
not until 2 February that NDHQ finally relented 
and agreed to raise the subject in Washington. 
By this time, however, it was already too late. 
 Gilday’s recommendation had been 
predicated on the FSSF not being engaged in 
active operations, as this would allow a Canadian 
withdrawal and reorganization of the Force to 
take place with a minimum of inconvenience 
to both parties. While the Canadian Army Staff 
in Washington had been mistaken in assuming 
that the Force was “engaged against the enemy” 
at the time of their warning to Ottawa, by the 
time NDHQ finally resolved to take the matter 
up with Washington, the situation had changed 
completely. On 31 January, the FSSF boarded 
a small fleet of landing craft bound for the 
port of Anzio, where the Force was to take up 
defensive positions on the right flank of the newly-
established Allied beachhead. 
 This return to the front eliminated any 
possibility of the Canadians being withdrawn 
from the Force. The irony is that if the Canadians 
had actually approached the Americans before 
the Force left for Anzio, in all likelihood they 
would have found that many of their views were 
shared not only by the authorities in Washington, 
but also by the newly-promoted commander 
of the Force, Brigadier-General Frederick. In 
February, Frederick provided Lieutenant-General 
Mark Clark with a detailed and rather blunt 
report on the difficulties facing the First Special 
Service Force almost three weeks following its 
arrival at Anzio:31 
19 February 1944
SUBJECT: First Special Service Force.
TO: Commanding General, Fifth Army, U.S. Army.
Upon completion of the current phase of operations, it will be 
necessary to know the basic decisions that have been made 
for the future of the First Special Service Force. The combat 
strength of the Force has been so reduced that it cannot again 
take any major part in an operation, nor can it execute minor 
actions for any long period. 
 The possible decisions appear to be limited to the 
following: 
  a)  Continue the Force as: 
 1) A joint United States-Canadian unit. 
 2) A US unit without Canadian personnel. 
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  b)  Discontinue the Force. 
To continue the Force with its characteristics is not possible 
under existing circumstances. The successes the Force has 
achieved in combat have been the result of special training and 
the development of certain qualities and spirit in the officers 
and enlisted men. This training and development required a 
comparatively long time under favorable training conditions. 
Comparable results cannot be accomplished by the Force if 
its casualties are replaced with men who are not specially 
trained, nor without its full complement of officers who have 
been indoctrinated with the spirit and combat methods of the 
command. 
There is no existing source, either United States or Canadian, 
of trained replacements for the Force. A limited number of 
officers can be obtained by commissioning non-commissioned 
officers from the command, but this source is not great and 
officers without trained enlisted men cannot accomplish those 
missions considered normal for the Force. 
If the Force is to be continued, it must be withdrawn from the 
combat zone to a place where suitable training conditions and 
facilities are available. After the arrival of new personnel, a 
period of four to six months should be allowed to accomplish 
their training. 
The organization of the Force must be adjusted to the type of 
operations in which the Force is being employed. The present 
organization was created for a specific mission and was based 
solely on the conditions surrounding the accomplishment of 
that mission which was totally unrelated to the missions in 
which the Force has actually engaged. 
Likewise, the equipment of the Force must be changed so 
that the Force will be properly equipped for the missions it 
is to be assigned, rather than to engage in combat with the 
handicap of unsuitable and inadequate equipment… Many 
essential functions, such as medical service, communications 
and supply during combat have not been provided and create 
serious problems during the type of combat in which the Force 
has engaged. 
Originally, the Force was to be made up equally of Canadian 
and United States personnel. This joint composition was 
agreed upon at the request of Allied officials who were neither 
American nor Canadian. It has no military basis, nor is it a 
sound arrangement. 
The Canadian Army furnishes no service troops, and all 
overhead and administrative functions for the Force, except 
for Canadian records and pay, are performed by United 
States personnel. The Canadian officers and enlisted men are 
subjected to strange conditions and to policies and practices 
not encountered in the Canadian Army… The United States 
has, by necessity, furnished all clothing and equipment for 
Canadian as well as United States personnel. This has 
required the Canadians to use weapons and equipment with 
which they have no previous experience. 
While the amalgamation of personnel of two armies into a 
single unit has worked successfully, it is basically unsound 
and difficult, and it has worked only because those intimately 
associated with the administration and supervision of the 
arrangement have made it work. 
Another complication is that employment of the Force must 
be approved by Canada as well as the United States. In the 
past, this has resulted in the Force not being sent to a theater 
to which the War Department desired to assign it. In addition, 
because of the inclusion of Canadian personnel in the Force, 
the British Government has had to be consulted and its 
agreement obtained for the Force’s employment. 
The Canadian government has established a figure of seven 
hundred (700) officers and other ranks as the Canadian 
personnel to be assigned to the Force. This figure…was 
based on an early estimate of the personnel to be required 
for the original mission. It does not represent half the Force, 
nor even half of the combat echelon. As a result of training 
losses and losses that have occurred since arrival in this 
theater, Canadian officers and other ranks now assigned to 
the Force total slightly more than three hundred (300). The 
Canadian Army headquarters in Ottawa decided that no 
Canadian replacements were to be furnished for the Force, 
and this decision appears to be firm. 
If the Force is to be continued as a joint United States-
Canadian unit, the Canadian Army should furnish officers and 
other ranks to bring the Canadian strength up to half of the 
total strength of the Force. To absorb new Canadian personnel 
it will, of course, be necessary to withdraw from the combat 
zone for an extended period so that the Canadians can be 
given necessary training.
If the Force is to be continued as a United States unit without 
Canadian personnel, problems of organization, equipment, 
and qualified replacements and training still exist. In addition, 
other problems less tangible but more far-reaching are 
introduced. The international character of the Force has placed 
it in the position of representing the extent to which the United 
States and Canada can cooperate in an undertaking. It is an 
exceptional example of complete integration of personnel 
of two armies into a single unit. The Force has become 
well known as a joint American-Canadian force, particularly 
in Canada where knowledge of its existence has become 
widespread. For the Force to continue in existence without 
Canadian personnel might bring about serious repercussions, 
particularly in Canada where the elimination of Canadian 
participation in the Force may be misconstrued…
The elimination of Canadian personnel from the Force would 
deprive the unit of many of its key officers and men. When the 
Force was activated, the Canadian Army furnished, in general, 
better qualified officers and enlisted men than did the United 
Brigadier General Robert T. Frederick discusses the 
results of an FSSF raid with Lieutenant Colonel Robert 
S. Moore.  A US Fifth Army tank is burning in the 
background, 15 April 1944. 
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States Army, and this has resulted in a large number of the 
key positions being filled by Canadians. 
It is considered that, because of the possible unfavorable 
reaction, both official and public, that would arise if the 
Canadian participation in the Force is dropped, it is better 
either to continue the Force as a joint force, or to discontinue 
it… 
The entire existence of the Force, until it was transferred to 
the North African Theater of Operations, was countenanced by 
the War Department only because of its international character 
and because of the interest of British officials, which no longer 
exists. The joint composition of the Force creates problems 
that must be solved without precedent or legal support. It 
is believed that the War Department would welcome the 
opportunity to discontinue this special unit, which has been 
a particular problem and unduly expensive. 
Special units, such as this Force, are not looked upon 
with favor by other units of the Army. There is an intense 
feeling of dislike arising from the belief that special units are 
particularly favored and that they receive too much credit for 
their accomplishments. This feeling has been encountered 
quite generally, particularly in those normal units that have not 
been associated with this Force in operations. While this point 
is not of importance, it is worthy of consideration in deciding 
whether this and other units should exist. 
Unless provisions are made for the reorganization, re-
equipment and replacement of personnel losses with 
adequately trained personnel, the Force will soon become an 
ineffective combat unit. Because of the international interest 
in the unit, it would be better that it be discontinued before 
any strained feelings are created and while it is looked upon 
with favor by both interested nations. The whole project is 
delicate and has potentialities for international complications. 
Should the Force encounter disaster in combat, it is possible 
that the Canadians at home may feel that their officers and 
men were unnecessarily sacrificed. Likewise, there is always 
the possibility of criticism for placing American soldiers under 
Canadian officers and non-commissioned officers should the 
fortune of battle be against them. 
For the sake of United States and Canadian relations, it may 
be best to let this unit pass out of existence while it is still in 
its prime, rather than to sustain it through a period when it will 
be remembered only for its faults and defects. 
Robert T. Frederick,
Brigadier-General, US Army,
Commanding.
 One year after recommending that that the 
First Special Service Force be committed to 
action at the earliest opportunity, Frederick’s 
letter of 19 February 1944 expressed grave 
concern over the long-term viability of the Force, 
noting in particular that after two months of 
sustained combat, the unit “cannot again take 
any major part in an operation, nor can it execute 
minor actions for any long period.” Having made 
no provision for replacing combat losses, and 
with no existing source of trained replacements 
– either Canadian or American – Frederick was of 
the opinion that the FSSF should be disbanded 
at the earliest opportunity…“rather than sustain 
it through a period when it will be remembered 
only for its faults and defects.” Though fully aware 
of the international difficulties involved, the letter 
leaves no doubt that Frederick now considered 
the bi-national composition of the Force to be a 
significant impediment that should be done away 
with as soon as possible. This, he felt, would be 
in the best interests of both nations. What his 
letter fails to consider, however, is whether such 
disbandment was even possible now that the 
Force had been committed to holding the line at 
Anzio. 
Reorganization Under Fire,
Spring 1944
Two days after Frederick’s letter to Fifth Army, Lieutenant-General Stuart sent the following 
cable to the Chief of General Staff in Ottawa: “The 
whole question of the future of the First Special 
Service Force is apparently now in the melting 
pot. I was called by telephone on Friday by [the] 
Chief of Combined Operations, who told me 
that…the Americans were now proposing that 
the force be disbanded, but hesitated to make 
specific recommendations until they knew the 
Canadian reaction to this proposal.”32  Within 
the FSSF itself, both Frederick and Gilday, the 
acting senior Canadian officer, now considered 
disbandment to be the best course of action. The 
Chief of Staff at CMHQ agreed, as did the CGS 
in Ottawa and the Canadian Army authorities 
in Italy. On the American side, General Jacob 
Devers, Commanding General of US forces in 
the North African Theater had also suggested 
that the Force be inactivated and the personnel 
reassigned.33  Opposed, however, were those 
commanders who were more immediately 
concerned with the situation at Anzio, including 
General Eisenhower and Lieutenant-General 
Clark. 
By the first week of March, the matter had been 
settled between the Anglo-American authorities 
and Clark’s Fifth Army was allowed to retain 
the FSSF as a combined US-Canadian unit. 
In Italy, the Canadian Army was instructed to 
bring the 1st Canadian Special Service Battalion 
back up to strength by drawing volunteers from 
the existing infantry reinforcement pools in the 
Mediterranean Theatre. Fifth Army, meanwhile, 
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went a step further in its effort to rebuild the Force 
when Clark decided “to increase its strength, 
revise its organization and equipment, and 
re-orient its mission to encompass essentially 
Ranger actions and, at least in part, paratroop 
capabilities.”34  Frederick’s letter of 19 February 
had recommended that the organization and 
equipment of the Force should be brought in line 
with the missions to which it was being assigned 
and this was exactly what Clark intended to do. 
 On 8 March, Fifth Army assigned the 456th 
Parachute Field Artillery Battalion as a permanent 
attachment to the FSSF and ordered the US 4th 
Ranger Battalion inactivated to provide the Force 
with roughly 20 officer and 500 enlisted man 
replacements.35  In doing so, Clark’s intent was 
to reorganize the First Special Service Force and 
expand the unit from its current strength of 2,000 
men to as much as 3,500 – an organization that 
would “combine the best of Fifth Army’s special 
troops into a hard-hitting, well-led unit which will 
be of even greater value to the Army Commander 
than its very excellent component parts.”36 
 This was easier said than done. In March 
1944, the officers and men of both the Ranger 
Battalions and First Special Service Force were 
equally convinced that theirs was most élite 
formation of the United States Army. This created 
some degree of tension when Fifth Army opted to 
combine these “very excellent component parts” 
into an expanded First Special Service Force. 
Many of the former Rangers resented being 
assigned to the Force: “We were amazed by the 
apparent lack of organization in the Force – we 
were also the outsiders coming into a new unit 
– we felt that we had been taken advantage of as 
we were never given the opportunity to join the 
Ranger Battalions forming in England.”37 The 
FSSF, meanwhile, considered many of these 
replacements to be “Rangers in name only,” 
as those Rangers with more than two years of 
overseas service had been returned to the United 
States as instructors.38  Overall, the integration 
of Ranger replacements into the First Special 
Service Force was not easily accomplished. 
 Canadian replacements, on the other hand, 
had literally lined up to volunteer for the Force, 
drawn by the unit’s reputation and the promise of 
higher pay. In April, the Canadian Army provided 
the FSSF with 15 officers and 240 other ranks 
replacements, though the officer responsible for 
the Canadian reinforcement stream in Italy had 
to personally intervene in order to prevent these 
Colonel Edwin A. Walker, who assumed command of the FSSF after Frederick’s departure, is seen here observing 
enemy positions in the Radicosa area. With him are Major Robert B. Walker of Wakima, Washington; Major J.M. Sector 
of Winnipeg, Manitoba; and Captain Frank W. Erikson of New Jersey. 16 January 1944.  
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men from being sent to Anzio without proper 
training: “With the Canadian reinforcements 
totally unacquainted with American weapons, 
customs and methods of fighting, I am somewhat 
concerned that in the event of these troops being 
involved in combat, there is a possibility of loss 
of life because of unfamiliarity with weapons.”39  
Seeing the point, Frederick agreed to provide the 
Canadians with two weeks of instruction by Force 
officers and NCOs before they were sent to the 
beachhead. Arriving at the port of Anzio on 27 
April, the Canadian replacements were divided 
among the three regiments of the Force.40 
 At this time, the FSSF was preparing for 
a role in one of three possible plans for the 
upcoming breakout from Anzio, which would see 
US VI Corps fight its way out of the beachhead 
and rejoin Fifth Army for an advance on Rome. 
Each of the scenarios under consideration would 
require the FSSF to operate in conjunction not 
only with the units on its flanks, but also the 
artillery, tanks, and tank destroyers that would 
be attached to the Force itself. Although the FSSF, 
by this time, had gained extensive experience in 
working with artillery, tank-infantry cooperation 
remained a relatively new concept to the Force. In 
April, however, by rotating units off the front line 
during the hours of daylight, the Force was able 
to conduct some fifteen exercises in tank-infantry 
cooperation in an effort to overcome this lack of 
experience. 
 Training exercises provided valuable 
experience and offered a chance to integrate the 
large number of US and Canadian replacement 
personnel into the regiments. Further, in keeping 
with Frederick’s earlier recommendation that the 
Force needed to be properly equipped for the type 
of operations in which it was to be employed, 
attachments to the FSSF for the upcoming 
breakout included the 463rd Parachute Field 
Artillery Battalion; D Company, 39th Combat 
Engineer Regiment; two companies of the 645th 
Tank Destroyer Battalion; A Company, 191st 
Tank Battalion; the mortars of B Company, 84th 
Chemical Battalion; and a Collecting Company 
from the 52nd Medical Battalion.41  Unfortunately, 
some of these attachments were made effective 
only days before the breakout began, which 
offered little time for them to train with the Force 
prior to the operation. 
 The breakout from Anzio began on the 
morning of 23 May 1944. During the opening 
phases of the attack, the FSSF made a rapid 
advance to cut Highway 7 and the rail line beyond, 
but was then forced into a temporary withdrawal 
when a counterattack by German Tigers 
knocked-out much of the supporting armour 
and shattered two of First Regiment’s forward 
companies. Following a brief reorganization, on 
25 May, Third Regiment advanced to secure the 
heights of Monte Arrestino, from which the Force 
continued through Cori and Rocca Massima to 
the town of Artena. It was here, on 28 May, that 
the FSSF advanced in the face of concentrated 
fire from German artillery, tanks, and small arms 
in a five-hour attack to sever the enemy’s line 
of communications along Highway 6. Pushing 
the advance in the direction of Valmontone and 
Colleferro, it was not until 2 June that the latter 
town was captured in an attack led by Second 
Regiment. Effective the next day, Task Force 
Howze – comprised of the 81st Reconnaissance 
Battalion and the 13th Armored Infantry – was 
attached to the FSSF to provide armoured 
support for the unit’s advance on Rome. Fighting 
its way through tough resistance on the outskirts 
of the city, on 4 June the FSSF made the first 
permanent entrance of Allied soldiers into Rome, 
where a day of intermittent street fighting ended 
in the capture of eight bridges over the River 
Tiber. 
 With Rome in Allied hands, the First Special 
Service Force was transferred to a nearby rest 
area on the shores of Lake Albano. It was at 
Lake Albano, while recovering from wounds 
suffered in a skirmish near the Tiber bridges, 
that Frederick had an opportunity to consider 
the “lessons learned” on the road from Anzio 
to Rome. Firstly, it had not been possible in 
one month to train FSSF replacements to the 
standard of the original personnel, just as he had 
warned in his letter of 19 February. No amount of 
enthusiasm on the part of these volunteers could 
equal the full year of intense training provided 
at Helena, Montana. Second, it was immediately 
apparent that armoured and artillery support 
had been absolutely critical to the success of 
recent FSSF operations – just as they would be for 
any conventional United States infantry regiment 
conducting conventional, infantry battles. When 
the supporting armour was destroyed during 
the breakout from Anzio, the advance faltered 
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and two forward companies of the Force were 
overrun. Five days later, at Artena, supporting 
artillery had been essential, both in preparing 
the ground over which the Force would advance 
and in repelling the German counterattacks that 
followed. With these lessons in mind, on 22 June, 
Frederick made the following recommendation to 
Lieutenant-General Clark:42  
HEADQUARTERS, FIRST SPECIAL SERVICE FORCE, 
U.S. ARMY
TO: Commanding General, Fifth Army, U.S. Army
After deliberate consideration of the many factors involved, 
it is recommended that the First Special Service Force be 
organized and equipped in accordance with the Tables of 
Organization and Equipment for an Infantry Regiment, with 
the addition of one (1) battalion of light Field Artillery. 
The non-availability of replacements specially trained for 
the Force, and the absence of facilities for training those 
replacements received to the standards of the original 
personnel, make it less desirable to continue the force under 
a special organization. 
The present equipment of the force includes large quantities 
of parachute and winter warfare equipment. Such a small 
percentage of the present personnel of the force have received 
parachute or winter training that there is no necessity for 
maintaining this special equipment for the command. 
The missions that have been assigned to the Force in combat 
have in most instances required the use of equipment 
normal to an Infantry regiment. This particularly applies to 
communication equipment. For each operation it has been 
necessary to make arrangements for the temporary use of 
necessary equipment. 
The operation for which the Force was originally organized did 
not require the medical personnel or motor transport that have 
been found necessary in the execution of missions assigned. 
Reorganization as an Infantry Regiment would correct these 
deficiencies. 
Robert T. Frederick,
Brigadier-General, U.S. Army,
Commanding.
The Force without Frederick?
Frederick’s letter of 22 June 1944 is perhaps best considered as the Force Commander’s 
“parting shot,” written on the day before his 
departure to command the First Airborne Task 
Force in the upcoming invasion of Southern 
France. On 23 June 1944, Frederick ordered 
the First Special Service Force assembled near 
the shore of Lake Albano for the presentation of 
awards. It was here that the Force Commander 
announced that he had been reassigned and 
was leaving the FSSF. “A discernable, protesting 
gasp broke the hush in the ranks of men who 
normally withheld such sentiments. The General 
carried the confidence and admiration of his 
men…. From the first fight to the last, memories 
of combat would evoke visions of the General up 
forward somewhere with the men who did the 
fighting.”43  On the day of Frederick’s departure, a 
saddened entry in the Canadian War Diary reads: 
“He has been the driving power behind the Force 
and its future is now in the air.”44  Without having 
read Frederick’s letter of 22 June, the officer who 
wrote this entry could not have known how close 
to the mark he actually was. 
 In July, General Clark endorsed Frederick’s 
recommendations for reorganizing the FSSF in a 
letter to the commander of the US Army’s North 
African Theater. In this letter, Clark forwarded 
Frederick’s suggestion that the current temporary 
attachments to the FSSF – the field artillery, 
combat engineers, and medical services – should 
be made permanent and the Force reorganized as 
an infantry regimental combat team.45 In his letter 
of 22 June, Frederick had cited two overriding 
reasons why this was necessary, the first being 
the impossibility of training replacements to 
the standard of the original personnel and, 
second, that the missions recently assigned 
to the Force had differed little from those that 
were regularly assigned to an infantry regiment. 
Further, from the Anzio breakout onwards, it had 
been necessary to make special arrangements 
for provisional attachments and the temporary 
loan of equipment. This was something that 
Frederick hoped an extensive reorganization of 
the First Special Service Force might correct and 
that Mark Clark’s support would help to make a 
reality. 
 Over the next six months, the new Force 
Commander, Colonel Edwin A. Walker, fought a 
rearguard action to save the FSSF as a special 
unit, but his efforts were ultimately doomed to 
failure. Although Walker repeatedly attempted to 
retain the Canadian element of the Force, both 
Canadian and American authorities now agreed 
with Frederick’s earlier assessment that the bi-
national composition of the Force introduced 
unnecessarily complex difficulties for both 
parties. Thus on 5 December 1944, the First 
Special Service Force was disbanded after a final 
parade in Villeneuve-Loubet, France, at which 
time the Canadians were returned to their own 
army and the American element reorganized to 
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form the 474th Infantry Regiment, complete with 
its own anti-tank company, heavy machine guns, 
mortars, and vehicles – all the things Frederick 
had been asking for since Anzio in order to do 
the type job the Force was being asked to do.
 In his letter of 19 February 1944, Frederick 
suggested that the time had come to let the 
Force “pass out of existence while it is still in 
its prime, rather than to sustain it through a 
period when it will be remembered only for its 
faults and defects.”46  In hindsight, this warning 
seems depressingly exaggerated. Today, the 
First Special Service Force is remembered both 
in Canada and the United States as the “North 
Americans” who broke the Winter Line atop 
Monte la Difensa and went on to become the 
first Allied formation to enter Rome. The Force 
is not, as Frederick once predicted it would 
be, remembered for its faults and defects. Nor 
should it be. During its brief existence, the Force 
established an enviable combat record – and did 
so despite the difficulties described in Frederick’s 
letters. On the ground, the FSSF proved 
repeatedly that Canadians and Americans could 
be molded into an extremely effective fighting 
unit. Viewed from above, however, the special 
status and international character of the Force 
introduced unique difficulties that were never 
fully resolved before the unit was disbanded in 
December 1944. Changes made to overcome 
these difficulties came too late to rescue the Force 
from disbandment, though it must be said that 
at least one of Frederick’s stated objectives was 
achieved when the Force was allowed to “pass out 
of existence” in December 1944, before its faults 
and defects threatened to overshadow any of its 
achievements. 
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